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Abstract 
Food sharing has been a central focus of research in human behavioral ecology and 
anthropology more broadly. Studies of food sharing have typically focused either on the 
individual’s motivations to share or the social formations and value systems that sharing 
produces. Here, we employ social network analysis to do both; investigating how strategic 
economic decisions, such as decisions about sharing, are embedded in and feed back onto social 
structure. This research is based on a questionnaire conducted with 110 Inuit households during 
twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork in Kangiqsujuaq, Nunavik, Canada. In Kangiqsujuaq, 
traditional Inuit resource harvesting and sharing practices co-exist with and depend upon 
opportunities and constraints in the cash economy. Food sharing in Kangiqsujuaq emerges as a 
complex social, political, and economic phenomenon that accomplishes different objectives for 
actors based on their social position. The network approach adopted in this research highlights 
the conjugate role of individual decisions and structural constraints in broader processes of social 
and cultural change. In the mixed economy of Kangiqsujuaq, food-sharing, social structure, and 
political influence are intimately connected. The results suggest that economic and political 
inequality in the settlement is reinforced by the social structures produced through sharing.     
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In Kangiqsujuaq, a small Inuit village in the Eastern Canadian Arctic, harvesting and 
sharing of traditional country foods, such as seal, arctic char, and beluga, are a major part of 
everyday life. Food sharing occurs both as communal meals and as gifts of country foods 
exchanged between family, friends, and neighbors. However, harvesting country foods is a costly 
endeavor in terms of time, energy, and money (Smith 1991). In the contemporary mixed 
cash/subsistence economies of Canadian Arctic settlements, harvesting requires snowmobiles, 
guns, gasoline, and a wide range of other equipment, whose purchase and maintenance depend 
on money earned through wage labor. Given these costs, why do wage-earning Inuit continue to 
spend their hard-earned money on harvesting and sharing of country foods? Why do Inuit not 
simply eat cheaper purchased foods, or focus only on filling their own freezers with country 
food? And, as is often the case for productive harvesters, when their freezers are already full, 
why do they acquire surpluses of country food and give them away, instead of setting the money 
used for hunting aside for the future? 
This question of why people should expend time and energy to acquire resources only to 
give them away to others has been a longtime focus of study in anthropology. Within the 
subfield of human behavioral ecology (HBE), researchers have identified a number of 
mechanisms that can motivate individuals to share with others, such as kin selection, tolerated 
theft, reciprocal altruism, and costly signaling (Gurven 2004; Jaeggi and Gurven 2013a; 
Winterhalder 1997). Some sharing can be explained by inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964, 1970), 
when individuals provision their kin (Gurven 2004; Hooper et al. 2015; Koster and Leckie 2014). 
In some cases, allowing others access to a resource may be less costly than trying to prevent 
needy individuals from taking it (Blurton Jones 1984). Often, sharing may foster long-term 
relationships of mutual aid and assistance (e.g., Hill and Kaplan 1993; Jaeggi and Gurven 2013b; 
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Jaeggi et al. 2016). Some studies have suggested that sharing food with others could be driven by 
the potential reputational benefits of provisioning others, as a person may acquire a reputation 
for hunting skill, generosity, and/or commitment to the group (e.g., Bliege Bird, Smith and Bird 
2001; Bliege Bird and Bird 2008; Gurven et al. 2000). In many cases, these various mechanisms 
appear to be operating in concert, although their relative importance may change between 
cultures, between resources, and even between individuals within a group (Gurven 2004).  
What this body of work fundamentally demonstrates is that while sharing food is 
certainly an economic transaction, it is also a social interaction. The close association of 
exchange and social relationships is, of course, a foundational observation within anthropology: 
exchange relationships—whether of ceremonial goods, livestock, or foodstuffs—reveal how 
individuals orient themselves to one another, situating them in the larger social structure of their 
community (Mauss 1923). Economic anthropologists have often focused not on the individual 
returns to sharing, but on how forms of exchange are related to the operation of broader systems 
of social and political relationships (Kent 1993; Peterson 1993; Price 1975; Testart 1987), and on 
the production of value and meaning (Appadurai 1986; Bourdieu 1980; Graeber 2001). As any 
particular exchange is simultaneously the product of an individual’s motivations (which will 
often be based on economic need), as well as of the social formations and value systems in which 
they operate, a full explanation of any exchange system requires a clear understanding of both 
(Coleman 1986; Irons 1979). How are individual transactions shaped by the larger structure in 
which they are situated? And how does that exchange in turn influence the evolution of the social 
system? Are the benefits of food sharing equally shared, or do some stand to gain more (or less) 
from these exchange relationships? In the case of food sharing in Kangiqsujuaq, what is the role 
of traditional food exchange when economic life in the settlement depends on cash? While 
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questions such as these may have been implicitly asked within the literature on food sharing, 
they have not yet been rigorously addressed, in part because the methods needed to answer them 
have only recently been developed. Advances in social network analysis, however, now make 
such questions empirically answerable.  
Social network analysis refers to a set of methods designed for the analysis of relational 
data. Relational data represent connections between agents, and are inherently different from 
most social science data because relations cannot be reduced to an attribute of any one agent 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). As such, social network analysis is the set of methods most 
appropriate for the study of social structure (Scott 2000). Borgatti et al. (2009) argue that the 
fundamental insight of social network analysis is the idea that explanations for an individual’s 
behaviors and personal outcomes may be found by examining their position in the network 
structure. For large, complex data sets, quantitative graph theoretic tools provide precise methods 
of comparing the properties of a graph and of the individuals represented in it (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994). Such tools and the relational perspective that they imply allow social scientists to 
study the individual as both shaped by social structural forces and also agentfully shaping those 
same structural realities (Coleman 1986). Network ideas have long been implicitly part of HBE 
research on food sharing specifically (e.g., Hames 2000; Kaplan and Hill 1985) and support 
relationships and exchange more generally (e.g., Macfarlan et al. 2013; Wiessner 1982). 
Recently, human behavioral ecologists have begun to apply network analysis techniques to 
explore and explain relational data (e.g., Alvard 2003; Dombrowski et al. 2013; Kasper and 
Borgerhoff Mulder 2015; Koster 2011; Lyle and Smith 2014; Nolin 2010, 2012; Ziker and 
Schnegg 2005). Nevertheless, these studies have largely focused on the individual and the dyad, 
rather than the overall structure and feedbacks therein.  
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Here, we employ network analysis to investigate the relationship between food sharing 
and socioeconomic status in Kangiqsujuaq. We first examine the question of why Inuit share 
country food, situating household sharing strategies in the broader context of the mixed 
cash/subsistence economy (cf. Gurven et al. 2015; Kasper and Borgerhoff Mulder 2015; Scelza 
et al. 2014; Ziker et al. 2016). As we will show, country food sharing in Kangiqsujuaq serves 
multiple purposes for different households, based in large part on their relative socioeconomic 
status. We then explore the collective consequences of these sharing strategies for patterns of 
inequality in the settlement. Those who are able to afford the high cost of harvest production are 
able to embed themselves in the sharing network and reap not only material, but also social and 
political benefits. Perhaps counterintuitively, we suggest that the dynamics of sharing may 
actually be contributing to inequality within Kangiqsujuaq, a conclusion that is consistent with 
historical evidence of social differentiation among Inuit (e.g., Hervé 2015; Pryor and Graburn 
1980; Stevenson 1997; Woollett 2007). These results demonstrate that a network approach 
allows us to not only identify the factors that shape household involvement in country food 
sharing in Kangiqsujuaq, but also the aggregate social results of those actions.  
Study Area 
Kangiqsujuaq is a settlement of roughly 800 people located in a large bay on the west 
coast of Hudson Strait in Nunavik, Canada. All but a half dozen of the village’s permanent 
residents are Inuit. The village is nestled in a valley between steep hills, near excellent hunting 
territories for a wide range of animals. The village is accessible only by plane, although it is 
possible to drive snowmobiles or boats to neighboring villages (roughly 175 km away) 
depending on the season. Most imported goods are brought to the settlement by sealift during the 
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summer months. Small quantities of perishable goods, mainly fruits and vegetables, arrive by 
plane on a roughly weekly basis.  
Nunavik is a region unique in Canada for having its own regional government within a 
province (Quebec): the Kativik Regional Government (KRG), which was created as a part of the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) in 1975.  Nearly all Nunavimmiut live in 
KRG social housing, paying a monthly rent that includes water, sewage, electricity, and heating 
for the use of a home (mostly duplex units) owned by the housing board. Nunavik also has a land 
claims organization, Makivik Corporation, which is responsible for administration of the lands 
covered by the lands claims agreement. Many Kangiqsujuarmiut hold local elected positions 
with KRG or Makivik. 
At Kangiqsujuaq, as throughout Nunavik, Inuit began to settle around trading posts and 
missions in the early part of the 20th century. Inuit settlement in the Canadian Arctic was a 
complex process that involved both the active manipulation of social and economic conditions 
by Inuit as well as the policies of the Canadian federal government, which discouraged 
settlement until after the Second World War (Damas 2002; Duhaime 1983). In Nunavik, nearly 
all families had moved to settlements by the early 1960s. Over the past few decades, the 
importance of formalized education, wage labor, and new forms of recreation have steadily 
increased throughout the Canadian North. Today, the most common form of employment in 
Kangiqsujuaq is public sector wage work, which includes jobs at the school, daycare, and 
nursing station, administrative positions at the local KRG and Makivik offices, and maintenance 
work. Private sector employment is limited, and includes jobs at the general stores as well as fly-
in fly-out jobs at a nickel mine in the region; however, few Inuit find work at the mine to be an 
attractive option. Unemployment rates are very high, but few individuals qualify for welfare 
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payments. Seniors qualify for various support payments, as do women supporting minors. Inuit 
households also receive occasional payments from mining royalties. Even with subsidies on 
housing and many food items and commodities, the need to import foods and other goods means 
that the cost of living in Nunavik is extremely high relative to southern parts of Canada (Kativik 
Regional Government 2016). The combination of the high cost of food and high unemployment 
means that poverty and food insecurity are serious social problems in the region, as they are 
elsewhere in the Canadian Arctic (Council of Canadian Academies 2014). In 2013–2014, 20% of 
Kangiqsujuarmiut had low food security and 21% had very low food security (Ready 2016, cf. 
Lawn and Harvey 2004). 
Traditional or “country” foods, such as seal, beluga, arctic char, caribou, and ptarmigan, 
continue to constitute an important part of the diet in Kangiqsujuaq. Duhaime et al. (2002) 
reported that 12.3% of all calories consumed by Nunavimmiut came from country foods, 
representing 58% of total meat intake. Lawn and Harvey (2004) obtained a similar figure for 
women in Kangiqsujuaq (11.1%) based on a 24-hour recall study. Harvesting of country foods 
(hunting, fishing, and gathering) remains an important economic activity for many households in 
Kangiqsujuaq; the livelihoods of most households involve negotiating their participation in wage 
labor and in traditional harvesting activities.  
Relying on country food is not a simple alternative to wage labor, however. Modern Inuit 
harvesting relies on a wide array of purchased goods, including major investments such as 
snowmobiles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and watercraft, as well as recurring expenses for 
supplies such as gasoline and ammunition. Inuit harvest participation is therefore mediated by 
access to cash and other materials (both personally-held resources and those accessed through 
social networks) as well as by the harvester’s knowledge and ability (Collings 2011; Langdon 
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1991; Wenzel 2000). Harvesting country foods consequently entails sizable investments of time, 
money, and energy. Hunting is therefore not a solitary endeavor; households coordinate their 
resources and effort in order to support their harvest production.  
Country food continues to be shared widely in Kangiqsujuaq as well as in other Inuit 
settlements (Bodenhorn 2000; Collings 2011; Harder and Wenzel 2012; Hovelsrud-Broda 2000; 
Kishigami 2000). Country and purchased foods are not substitutable in this respect: although 
purchased foods may be included in shared meals and are occasionally given to needy 
households, usually upon demand, they are not “shared” in the way that country foods are, that 
is, given deliberately as gifts and distributed widely. Although there is a small “black market” 
trade in country food, selling country food to individuals is prohibited by the JBNQA. Although 
the prohibition is not strictly enforced, many Nunavimmiut strongly disapprove of the practice of 
selling country food precisely because it undermines sharing, believing that traditional foods 
should be free to all despite the costs of modern harvest production (Gombay 2010). 
Nunavimmiut are allowed to sell harvested foods to the local Hunter Support Program, a 
government program that purchases food from hunters and makes the food freely available to the 
community. However, the program’s budget is relatively limited, and its operation can be 
sporadic and unpredictable. Consequently, access to country food continues to be primarily 
mediated by harvesting participation and social relations rather than by markets or formal 
institutions.  In addition to shares given (or asked for) directly between households, country food 
is also occasionally shared over the local FM radio. This most often occurs when a household 
has had an unusually large harvest, generally of arctic char. In this case, a household member 
will call the radio to announce that anyone who wishes can stop by to collect a share; dozens of 
people often respond.  
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Given the costs associated with modern harvest production (Smith 1991), why do Inuit 
continue to pursue and share country foods?  Food transfers may involve the creation of social 
and symbolic value as well as the fulfillment of economic needs (Bourdieu 1980; Graeber 2001). 
Numerous scholars have suggested that the persistence of traditional subsistence activities in 
Inuit communities despite their integration into broader industrialized economies, a pattern now 
commonly referred to as a “mixed” economy  (Wolfe and Walker 1987), is related to the social 
importance of sharing country food for Inuit (Bodenhorn 2000; Collings 2011; Hovelsrud-Broda 
2000). Wenzel (1995, 2000) has argued that the mixed cash/subsistence economic system that 
characterizes modern Inuit settlements is fundamentally a social economy, not a market 
economy, because Inuit economic decisions are often driven by investments in social 
relationships, rather than by the accumulation of material wealth or cash. Through our modeling 
of the flows of food, we are able to investigate not only the economic but also the social value of 
these resources. We study the economic and social benefits that Inuit households derive from 
their investment in sharing country food, specifically through a network approach that allows us 
extend dyadic exchange to the broader social structure of the community. In particular, we link 
information on the sharing of country food with information on social status to explore the 
political economy of country food sharing in Kangiqsujuaq.   
Methods 
Fieldwork 
The fieldwork for this research was conducted between September 2013 and July 2014 by the 
first author. This article focuses on a household questionnaire, which gathered data on household 
demographics, employment, income, hunting participation, food sharing, and food security from 
10  
a large, representative sample of households in the settlement. Portions of the survey were 
adapted from instruments used in a previous study of food security in Kangiqsujuaq (Lawn and 
Harvey 2004) and in harvest studies by the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (e.g., 
Kukkonen and Zimpelman 2012), with the help of Kangiqsujuarmiut who pretested the survey. 
In total, 110 of 146 Inuit households in the settlement (75.3%) were surveyed. The population 
sampled in the household survey shows the same age (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: D = 0.04, p = 
.72) and sex (Chi2 = 0.05, p = .82) distributions as the 2011 census data for Kangiqsujuaq 
(Statistics Canada 2012). Households are defined as people living together in a single dwelling, 
but household composition is highly variable, from multigenerational families (in one case, 4 
generations), to single women with children (representing 35% of households), to men living 
alone. In general, interviews were conducted with the head of the household by the first author 
and a local translator or research assistant. 35% of interviews were conducted in Inuktitut, and 
the rest in English. 55% (60/110) of respondents were women. Respondents were asked to 
provide information covering the previous 12 months. The study was approved by the 
Kangiqsujuaq Northern Village and by the Stanford Institutional Review Board. 
 
Data 
In the analyses reported in this article, we draw on the following data sources:  
Country Food Sharing Network: As part of the household survey, household heads were 
asked to free-list their most important country food sharing partners, both who they gave to and 
received from. From these reports, we create a network representing the sharing of country food 
among households. For every pair of households, if either one reported in the survey that they 
shared food with the other (giving or receiving), we record a tie representing that flow of food, 
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following Nolin (2008, 2010). Although households that did not participate in the study were 
named, only households who completed the survey are included in the analysis, because of the 
need for complete data in the network analyses. This network consists of 110 households 
(nodes), and captures 57% of all theoretically possible ties within the village and 75% of all 
theoretically possible ties within the survey sample. In this in-sample network, households give 
and receive food from 4.55 other households, however, there is substantial variation between 
households in how much they give and receive (out-degree s.d. = 4.57; in-degree s.d. = 3.10). 
4.2% of all possible ties between households in the sample are realized, of which 37.6% are 
reciprocated. 
Household Food Security Assessment: Households also answered a set of questions 
evaluating their food security, the results of which are reduced here to a binary variable 
categorizing households as food secure or food insecure. Households designated as food insecure 
experienced at least one episode of food shortage that resulted in a reduction in food intake by 
adults in the household (cutting or skipping meals), in the twelve months preceding the 
assessment. 38% of households in the sample are food insecure according to this metric. The 
indicator of food security used here is a measure of poverty not directly associated with harvest 
production or with country food shares received (Ready 2016). 
Household Socioeconomic Attributes: The household survey also included questions on 
household demographics, recent employment history, harvest production (including harvests of 
beluga, ringed seal, caribou, and geese), income and other socioeconomic indicators. The 
monthly incomes of household heads over the twelve months preceding the interview are 
summed in order to obtain a total one-year income for the household, including any reported 
pensions or government benefits. For most analyses, harvest production is tallied in kilocalories 
12  
using data from Smith (1991), and then categorized into three groups: low-producers 
(households that did not harvest any of four species mentioned in the survey), mid-producers 
(those who did some harvesting), and super-producers. Super-producers are defined as 
households in the top 30% of harvests (BurnSilver et al. 2016, Wolfe 1987), and harvested 
approximately 80% of all calories represented in the harvest data. Households also indicated 
whether they gave away country food over the local FM radio in the past year, a variable we 
refer to as “FM giving.” A separate variable also indicates households headed by single females. 
These are usually young single parent households, but the category also includes some mature 
households headed by elderly women. Variables representing workplace affiliation (e.g., the 
school, the coop) were also created using the employment data. Workplaces are referred to by 
letter (A, B, etc.) in order to protect the anonymity of respondents.  
Kinship Data: Kinship relationships were gathered along with the sharing network data 
and supplemented by interviews with informants and genealogical data obtained from the Avataq 
Cultural Institute. Ties between parents/children and siblings are used here to define whether 
households are “close kin,” including both biological and adoptive relations. A second broader 
kinship term is also included, dividing the population into 16 kinship groups, each primarily 
associated with one or two common local family names, ranging in size from four to twenty 
households (mean = 10.7, s.d. = 4.8), with some overlap between groups because households 
may belong to more than one cluster. One household was an isolate. This household-by-group 
matrix was then used to create a kinship group network.1  
Political Appointments: Records of the composition of a local elected council from 1980 
to 2014 were gathered from publicly available sources. Membership on this council is 
determined by the popular vote obtained by candidates who present themselves for election. 
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Living individuals who have been elected to the council have been linked to households 
represented in the survey sample to create a variable indicating whether a household includes 
someone who was ever on the council. We call this “historic council membership.” Household 
membership in several other elected community positions during fieldwork in 2013–2014 is also 
considered, which we call “2013 council membership.”  
Data analysis 
To describe the sharing network structure, we develop an Exponential Random Graph 
Model (ERGM) of the network using a range of household-level and relationship attributes. The 
aim of using an ERGM is to identify the individual (node-level) and group structural (network-
level) forces that best predict the overall structure of the observed network, represented in Figure 
1. The model coefficients in an ERGM are analogous to the coefficients in a logistic regression, 
where the response is the probability of a tie between two nodes.2 All network analyses were 
conducted in R (R Development Core Team 2012) using the statnet suite of packages (Handcock 
et al. 2003). We also present regressions to further investigate some of the patterns identified in 
the ERGM. Regression analyses use the MASS package (Venables and Ripley 2002) in R.3  
Results 
ERGM results 
The results of the ERGM are shown in Table 1. The model presented here4 includes 
measures of household kinship and proximity, harvest production, economic status and food 
security, employment status, demographic characteristics, and a number of structural control 
variables.5   
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The ERGM confirms that households with greater resource availability are more likely to 
give country food than households with fewer resources. The model also shows that households 
tend to share with kin and neighbors. The effect of close kinship on the probability of a tie is the 
strongest effect in the model (odds-ratio 21.16). The effect of belonging to the same kin group, 
while also significant, is much less but still considerable (odds-ratio 3.56). Close kin ties were 
subtracted from the kin group network, so these are exclusive categories in the ERGM. The 
probability of a sharing tie between households decreases with increasing distance between 
them. As some houses are as far as one kilometer apart, while the coefficient for distance is 
small, it has a large impact on the probability of a sharing tie between households in different 
parts of the settlement. For example, immediate neighbors are 1.63 times more likely to 
exchange food than households that are 500m apart. We considered that individuals working 
together might also be more likely to share with each other, but workplace homophily was not 
significant; instead, households with individuals working at two particular institutions are 
associated with significantly greater out-degree. Not surprisingly, these are workplaces 
associated with desirable jobs with good pay, good benefits, and good working hours.  
Single female-headed households and elders are preferred targets of giving. However, 
more direct measures of household need, whether food insecurity, low harvest production, or 
household size, are not significant predictors of incoming ties. Owning more hunting vehicles 
also has a small negative effect on in-degree. Because owning more hunting vehicles is 
associated with higher income and harvest production, households with more vehicles tend to 
have higher out-degree to begin with, so this covariate simply reflects that these households are 
more likely than others to support one-way outgoing ties.  
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Although neither food security nor harvest production alone were found to be significant 
predictors of incoming ties, the model does find different probabilities of sharing ties between 
households with certain socioeconomic profiles, as measured by the interaction of household 
food security and harvest production. Food-insecure super-households (“I-Super”) have a strong 
tendency for sharing with food-secure non-hunters (“S-Low”). In other words, these cash-poor 
hunters prefer to give to cash-rich non-hunters. Although we do not have complete exchange 
network data for other currencies, this pattern likely reflects exchanges across currencies 
between these types of households. Unemployed hunters, especially young men, often share with 
more affluent non-hunting households (usually relatives) and receive cash, gas, or other goods in 
exchange. Food-insecure super-households are the least common household type (n = 9 or 8.2% 
of households), which is not surprising given the high cost of harvesting.  
Food-secure super-households (“S-Super”) have a higher probability of sharing with 
other food-secure households and/or super-households than with households that are food 
insecure and lower harvest. In fact, food-secure super-households have the strongest affiliation 
with other food-secure super-households, which may represent generalized reciprocity among 
this relatively restricted group (n = 20 households). This pattern is also suggested in Figure 1 and 
confirms the importance of ties between cooperators (cf. Apicella et al. 2012; Lyle and Smith 
2014). The second group that food-secure super-households are most likely to share with are 
non-harvesting food secure households. This may also represent trade, as suggested for food-
insecure super-households, however, this is less certain because food-secure super-households 
tend to finance their own hunting efforts. Finally, low- and mid-production food-insecure 
households (“I-Low” and “I-Mid”) tend to have sharing ties with each other. Mid-production 
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food-insecure households give to fewer food-secure non-hunters (“I-Mid” to “S-Low”), who, as 
mentioned above, are frequently the targets of super-households. 
Reciprocity has a sizable effect in the model, second only to the effect of close kinship. A 
household is nearly five times more likely to share with another household if they receive food 
from that household. The strength of this term suggests that contingent reciprocity is an 
important determinant of the structure of the sharing network, because the model also includes 
several terms that control for homophilous behaviors (e.g., sharing among kin and super 
households), which could induce generalized reciprocity among subgroups within the network.6 
Several examples of the ERGM predictions are worked through in Figure 2, which shows 
the probability of ties between households with different socioeconomic characteristics. These 
examples clearly show the strong effects of kinship and reciprocity, but also highlight the 
relative disadvantage of low production, food-insecure households, particularly if they are not 
female-headed. Although the effects of several variables (such as income and giving food over 
the FM) are not illustrated in Figure 2, the effect of these variables exaggerate the basic patterns 
shown because of the positive correlations between high income, high harvest productivity, and 
food security. In summary, the ERGM results provide evidence for contingent reciprocity, along 
with suggestive evidence of trade. Nevertheless, 62% of ties are unreciprocated, and high 
income, high harvest households maintain a large number of one-way ties towards low income, 
low harvest households that are unlikely to be able to reciprocate in kind or otherwise. These 
patterns suggest that, while sharing widely is clearly associated with high socioeconomic status, 
there might be other pathways between these traits that motivate wealthy households to share.   
Sharing & political influence 
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To further unpack the positive associations between country food sharing and affluence 
in Kangiqsujuaq, we investigate whether food sharing may operate as a signal of commitment to 
the community (cf. Bird and Bliege Bird 2010; Bliege Bird and Power 2015). In particular, we 
hypothesize that sharing country food widely is linked to people’s ability to access positions of 
community leadership. To examine this hypothesis, we perform logistic regressions on two 
variables that are indicators of individual prominence and leadership in Kangiqsujuaq: (1) 2013–
2014 elected council memberships; and, (2) historical council membership (1980-2012). The left 
panel of Table 2 shows the regression results for the 2013 council memberships. Sharing 
network out-degree was not retained in the model; however, giving country food nevertheless 
emerges as an important correlate of recent election: the strongest predictor in the model of 
whether a household includes someone who was a member of an elected local council in 2013–
2014 was whether that household had given away food over the FM radio in the past 12 months 
(odds-ratio = 24.34). The number of hunting vehicles owned by a household is also correlated 
with recent election. Importantly, ownership of hunting vehicles is not only a reflection of 
household income over a longer term than 12-month income, but it is also a visible signal of a 
commitment to using disposable income to support country food harvesting. Finally, 
membership on the historic council is also an important predictor of the 2013 councils, which 
reflects continuity in tenure of elected positions for households, even across different local 
councils. Figure 3 visually summarizes some of the patterns observed in the regression for 2013 
council membership, and clearly shows the increased involvement of council members’ 
households in sharing, as well as their increased economic status. Although council membership 
is clearly correlated with numerous indicators of sharing participation and socioeconomic status, 
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not all of these were retained in the stepwise regression analysis because of strong collinearity 
between many of these variables. 
The right panel of Table 2 shows the regression results for the historical council data. 
Interpreting this regression requires caution because the temporality of the data is collapsed in 
the binary variable representing election, and characteristics of households may have changed 
substantially if the individuals were on the council 20–30 years ago rather than within the past 
few years. Therefore, it is not clear whether the predictors in the model reflect the reasons why 
individuals get elected, or effects that occur after election. Nevertheless, the regression provides 
suggestive results regarding the types of households that have participated in local political life 
over the past 30 years. As in the model for current councils, ownership of hunting vehicles is a 
strong correlate of historic council membership. The importance of this factor in both the 
historical and current council models suggests that high income—combined with a commitment 
to harvesting—are characteristics of local council members both before and after election. 
Further, sharing network out-degree has a significant effect in the model, suggesting that 
individuals who have been members of the council tend to come from households that are 
heavily invested in the sharing economy. Mean household age is also significant, although this is 
essentially a control variable that accounts for the fact that older persons have a greater chance of 
ever having been on the council.  
These results provide strong evidence for why affluent households in Kangiqsujuaq 
support one-way sharing ties to low-resource households in addition to engaging in supportive 
reciprocal sharing relationships. Households that are more heavily invested in the sharing 
economy—and households that engage in food distributions over the FM radio—are more likely 
to have members who have been elected to local council(s). Holding a council position has both 
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direct and indirect social and economic benefits, including monetary compensation (roughly 
Can$700/month for the municipal council) as well as influence in important community affairs, 
such as major construction projects and community programs.   
Discussion 
The ERGM and regression analyses suggest that while sharing of country food is driven 
by reciprocity, trade, and wealth, sharing is itself a predictor of the political success and 
influence of wealthy households. In the discussion, we delve into the connections between 
generosity, influence, and affluence in the settlement and consider how these patterns might 
articulate with processes of cultural, social, and economic change. Namely, we explore how 
traditional food sharing may contribute to economic and political inequality in the contemporary 
mixed economy. Finally, we discuss the implications of these results for how, as anthropologists, 
we can better negotiate the gap between models of individual economic decision making and the 
real constraints imposed by social structure.  
Sharing and economic strategies 
In late September 2013, Jaani, a hunter in his late 40s, went on an overnight ATV hunt 
with his two young adult sons and a couple of their friends. They returned home with over 130 
Arctic char and two small caribou. One of the friends took six fish from the catch, and Jaani 
brought the rest home. He kept the caribou, but called the FM radio to give away the fish, 
inviting anyone who wanted some to come to the shack behind the house and take it. Jaani did 
not pay attention to who came to get fish that weekend. Too many people dropped by, and he 
could not be there to observe everyone who came by to collect a share. He was not concerned 
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with the details of the distribution beyond that it had been widely shared. Jaani’s wife, though, 
had paid closer attention. Besides the close family members who dropped by regularly and were 
always given shares, more distant relatives and some unrelated men and women also showed up 
to claim a share on this occasion. Most of these distant relatives and others were from 
households with demonstrable food need, who did not hunt much themselves and were unlikely 
to be able to reciprocate the shares they received. Another hunter or two, friends of the family, 
also stopped by for a social visit and grabbed a fish or two on their way out because they did not 
have any fresh fish at home. 
About a week or so after this event, another hunter, Naalak, an Inuk in his late 30s, 
caught a harp seal while out on his canoe looking for caribou. Because most Kangiqsujuarmiut 
do not consider harp seals to be good to eat, Naalak skinned the animal for its pelt and gave all 
the meat to a friend of his, Pitsiulaq, who owns a dog team. A week or so later, Pitsiulaq caught 
seven caribou. On his return, Pitsiulaq gave Naalak a generous share of fresh caribou meat, 
which was a welcome surprise to Naalak, who had been caribou hunting several times in the past 
few weeks but had not encountered any. Around the same time, Alaku, a married woman in her 
fifties, was asked to collect some mussels by a friend in exchange for Can$40. She collected 
mussels for this same woman a few more times before freeze-up in early December; each time 
she received cash payments.  
This small glimpse of day-to-day country food exchange in Kangiqsujuaq illustrates the 
main findings reported above: country food sharing has multiple social and economic functions 
in the mixed economy. Households who give away their harvests can benefit from reciprocity, 
trade, and/or enhanced reputations, not to mention the contribution of sharing to Inuit social 
well-being (Condon et al. 1995; Nuttall 1992; Searles 2002). Moreover, the analyses suggest that 
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both the extent of engagement in sharing and the particular rewards derived from it differ 
between households. As the examples above show, super-households, such as those to which 
Jaani, Naalak, and Pitsiulaq belong, engage in directed reciprocity, especially with each other, 
but also sometimes participate in broadcast sharing of large food surpluses. These broadcast 
sharing events are linked to social status, as measured by local election results. Not 
coincidentally, both Jaani and his wife—as well as Naalak and Pitsiulaq—hold prominent white-
collar public services positions in the community, which allows them to afford substantial 
outlays for equipment and hunting supplies, even though the food they harvest is often given 
away without expectation of return.  
In contrast, Alaku is also member of a super-household; but her husband is unemployed, 
and both she and her adult children who live at home have only low-paid, part-time work. Thus, 
her family regularly attempts to parlay their harvesting activities into additional income. They 
have mixed success in doing so for a number of reasons, including the high cost and uncertainty 
of harvesting, the unreliability of the Hunter Support Program, which only sometimes has money 
to purchase food from hunters, and the unwillingness of many Kangiqsujuarmiut to pay for 
country food outright (cf. Gombay 2010). Alaku’s household experienced shortages of store food 
at times when Alaku was not able to work enough hours at her job. Undoubtedly, however, their 
harvesting gives them a considerable economic advantage over non-hunting households with 
similar employment patterns: not only do they produce a lot of food themselves, but other super-
households share with Alaku’s family quite often. Together, Alaku and her husband have at least 
21 adult siblings (biological and adopted) living in the settlement, which also greatly contributes 
to their advantageous position in the sharing network. 
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In Kangiqsujuaq, we find that there are multiple motivations and strategies that may lead 
households to pursue and share country food. As others have recognized (e.g., Gurven 2004; 
Nolin 2010, 2012), it is not a question of one mechanism (for example, kin selection or 
reciprocity) explaining food sharing to the exclusion of others, but rather a question of the 
relative importance of multiple mechanisms, all of which are likely acting to some extent. Here, 
we further stress that particular mechanisms may be more or less relevant in explaining the 
sharing behavior of households in different socioeconomic positions, as well as in different 
cultural and ecological settings (e.g., Koster 2011; Ziker and Schnegg 2005). For example, high 
harvest but food-insecure households focus on attempting to convert country food into other 
material resources, such as cash. In contrast, for high-income, high-harvest households, increased 
participation in sharing, and giving away food in particular ways (for example, over the FM 
radio) is associated with political success in the settlement. Country food sharing serves multiple 
purposes for households, both economic and social.  
Sharing, inequality, and the persistence of the mixed economy 
Contrary to other mixed economies where wealthy households have been observed to 
divest from sharing networks (e.g., Kasper and Borgerhoff Mulder 2015), our analyses 
demonstrate that the benefits of giving away food are concentrated among high income and high 
harvest households, because these households are able to give the most (cf. Gurven et al. 2015). 
Households that give more also have more reciprocal ties. We stress though, that this is a mixed 
economy that has developed over more than a century of trade and increasing market integration, 
not a recent transition, and that country food today is a small—although nutritionally 
important—component of Inuit diets. The question we ask is why does sharing persist at all? 
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And why are wealthy households more, rather than less, invested in sharing than poorer 
households? We find that generosity with country food provides important reputational benefits 
that have consequences in the political arena and that are also likely to be important in securing 
employment, favors, and other forms of social and economic assistance.  
This distribution of the benefits of sharing has important social and economic 
ramifications, thanks to the links between affluence, influence, and generosity (Figure 3). Given 
the dependence of harvesting on the cash economy, these linkages could produce positive 
feedbacks (generosity leads to access to influential positions which improves access to resources 
which enable generosity) and create lasting differences in economic and relational wealth 
between households and between kin groups. The existence of such trends is suggested in Figure 
4, which shows the kinship network positions of living individuals in both council datasets. 
Many of the council members come from dense clusters within the kinship graph. Many are also 
closely related: of the twenty-five individuals in the historical council sample, there are four 
parent-child pairs, five husband-wife pairs, and three groups of siblings, not to mention 
relationships between cousins and in-laws.  
Just as these connections between generosity, influence, and affluence can lead to a 
compounding of the benefits for better-situated households, it can similarly lead to a 
compounding of the economic and social disadvantage of households without these traits. Low-
income, low-harvest households in Kangiqsujuaq have few means to build reciprocal sharing 
ties, and even less to engage in signaling through wide distributions of food. Many employed 
persons in Kangiqsujuaq readily express how much they value their jobs. These sentiments 
reflect the importance of employment for living a full life in the settlement, which means being 
able to give country food away as well as receive it. Low-income, low-harvest households in 
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general are unable to participate fully in the traditional economy because they are unable to give 
(in kind or otherwise).  
These data suggest that Kangiqsujuaq is characterized by relatively high levels of 
inequality (Figure 5), particularly when it comes to harvesting. Sharing does redistribute 
resources in the settlement, but not sufficiently to create equal opportunities for all. On the 
contrary, giving food creates obligations (for example, to reciprocate in kind, to pay for gas next 
week) that benefit those with the resources required to be generous. These results resonate with 
studies of the relationship between group leadership and cooperation (Glowacki and von Rueden 
2015; Hooper et al. 2010; Powers and Lehmann 2014), and provide support for recent 
anthropological research on the evolution of inequality (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009; Bowles 
et al. 2010; Mattison et al. 2016). 
In possibly the only major work on socioeconomic inequality among Inuit, Mitchell 
(1996) argues that Canadian Inuit today are characterized by two social classes: “the native 
corporate elite,” and others whom she characterizes as “simple commodity producers.” Using 
extensive historical evidence, Mitchell argues that the process of contact, sedentarization, 
community organization, and land claims settlements led to the gradual emergence of Inuit 
leaders among those who interfaced with whalers, traders, and eventually, Canadian government 
officials. These “corporate elite” enjoy economic and political advantage as a result of their 
collaboration with outside capitalists. This model provides an interesting perspective on the role 
of capitalist and colonial influences in shaping Inuit nationalism and in providing the substrate 
for an emergent class structure. However, although the results presented here also suggest that 
Inuit settlements are characterized by substantial social and economic inequality, the corporate 
elite model cannot explain the persistence of the mixed economy in its current form, in which 
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local affluent households—not the most marginalized households—are the most engaged in 
subsistence production (see also BurnSilver et al. 2016). In other words, an analysis that focuses 
exclusively on “top-down structures” (i.e., the role of the Canadian state) in influencing 
economic and political development in Arctic settlements, does not make sufficient room for 
“bottom-up structures” resulting from interactions between Inuit themselves. 
Hervé (2015) provides key insight into these bottom-up structures by identifying the 
interactional nature of power and influence among Inuit. She argues that persons who 
accumulate material resources, social relations, and knowledge are obligated to assist others, but 
are also listened to, and thus, power among Inuit is produced by wealth (Hervé 2015: 365). This 
conclusion is supported by the analysis presented here, which links traditional food sharing 
(specifically, giving away food) with political success and socioeconomic status. However, the 
influence of individuals depends on the cooperation of others, and Inuit leaders are only 
recognized as such when they take into account the needs of others (Hervé 2015: 332; Oosten 
1986). Differences in wealth and power come with substantial obligations and responsibilities. 
Despite the omnipresent rhetoric of equality, Inuit are decidedly non-egalitarian, and this 
is not simply a result of settlement and colonial influence (Hervé 2015). Early explorers and 
ethnographers (e.g., Hawkes 1916; Stefansson 1913) may have had difficulty detecting Inuit 
sociopolitical organization because of its informal nature. Later ethnographers, historians, and 
archaeologists paid more attention to variability in Inuit social structures and suggested status 
differentials or incipient social inequality among several groups, driven by differences in hunting 
skill and the need for leaders in cooperative hunting (Damas 1969; Friesen 1999; Morrison 1994; 
Savelle and Wenzel 2003; Spencer 1959; Stevenson 1997). Prior to settlement, material and 
social inequality may have been kept in check among Nunavimmiut and other Eastern Arctic 
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Inuit by resource limitation, mobility, and the need for cooperation over the long-term. The 
results presented here provide quantitative evidence of inequality among Inuit, and show that in 
the settlement context inequality is, perhaps surprisingly, driven in part by the redistribution of 
country food. The strong effect of reciprocity, particularly among food-secure super-households, 
means that much country food sharing is often among those who are already relatively well-
situated. However, the strong obligation to share with kin means that those individuals with the 
resources to share beyond their kin groups (particularly over the radio) are uniquely able to 
signal a commitment to the entire community, not just their own relatives. Through such acts, 
affluent households are able to justify their privileged access to a much broader range of 
resources (e.g., gas subsidies for hunters, political and public service positions).  Acts of 
generosity by politically-connected individuals extend to other spheres as well, in major gift 
distributions that take place during community events sponsored by local organizations. These 
distributions include prizes for games, raffles, and “candy drops” in which organizers literally 
shower attendees with free candy, toiletries, and household supplies ranging from feather dusters 
to rifle cases. These “candy drops” are reminiscent of historical harvest celebration events 
reported in Alaska (Fienup-Riordan 1983). Tellingly, the forms of broadcast giving that take 
place in Nunavik today are tied up with political office and wealth. While these patterns linking 
generosity and leadership reflect long-term continuities in Inuit social relations, transformations 
brought about by Euro-Canadian institutions, population growth, and settlement have 
dramatically altered the social and economic consequences of country food sharing.  
This model of Inuit food sharing simultaneously explains the persistence of the mixed 
economy among Inuit and relatively high levels of socioeconomic inequality. Harvesting persists 
in Inuit settlements because Inuit economic life is inseparable from complex obligations that 
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integrate kinship, politics, economics and sociality. Similar arguments have been made about 
Inuit sharing in Nunavut, the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, Alaska, and Greenland (Bodenhorn 
2000, Collings 2011, Hovelsrud-Broda 2000, Wenzel 2000); however, we expand our argument 
to show how the intertwining of economic and social life has consequences for socioeconomic 
inequality at the settlement level. The mixed economy persists because food sharing is a strategy 
by which privilege is expressed and maintained by those who give. In sum, Inuit food sharing is 
nothing less than Inuit social structure.  
Store and country food are clearly not substitutable for Inuit, because the currency of 
foraging (and sharing) among Inuit is not simply calories. Although the dietary contributions of 
harvested and shared food are important for most Inuit households, country food also represents 
a fundamental means by which Inuit negotiate relationships with one another, and Inuit today 
reap economic, political, and social rewards from harvesting and sharing. The fact that food 
exchanges have dietary benefits to receivers in addition to the socio-political benefits to givers 
means that although the returns are variable, households on both ends of the spectrum have an 
incentive to participate in the system. Inuit society continues to be characterized not just by a 
foraging ideology, but by a social structure that is reinforced by foraging and sharing. 
Consequently, this research supports other work identifying the behavioral basis of ideology, 
beliefs, and values (Bourdieu 1977; Dahl 2000; Wenzel 2009). Although Inuit society has 
transformed dramatically over the past decades, the changes that have occurred have not 
eliminated the social structural contexts that allow a subsistence economy to be reproduced.    
Sharing & levels of analysis  
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Multiple mechanisms foster country food sharing in Kangiqsujuaq, and these patterns, 
notably the linkage of generosity and political influence, help explain the continuation of the 
mixed economy in the settlement, despite the substantial investments necessary for contemporary 
hunting and harvesting. In conclusion, we suggest that the theoretical and analytic perspective 
adopted in this study (the merging of human behavioral ecological models with a network 
approach to analyzing behavior), offers a means to reconcile the roles of structure and agency in 
the study of socioeconomic decision-making, by providing a connection between individual 
decisions and group-level patterning. The network analyses demonstrate how the ability of 
households to participate in different sharing strategies is affected by their economic status, and 
also shows that the benefits to their actions are shaped by structural factors such as kinship. Of 
particular significance is that the network framework reveals variability in the socioeconomic 
strategies available to households in Kangiqsujuaq. Food sharing among Inuit does not have a 
single function; rather it emerges as a complex social, political, and economic phenomenon that 
accomplishes different goals for actors based on their social position. 
By incorporating social structure into the analysis of “cooperative” behavior, this 
approach addresses theoretical and methodological gaps between sociocultural anthropology and 
human behavioral ecology. A major distinction between human behavioral ecology and much of 
the rest of contemporary anthropology is HBE’s micro-level focus on individual trade-offs and 
decisions, rather than a top-down interest in macro-structures such as state institutions (Smith 
1991). Scaling up from individual behaviors to population-level patterns is one of the biggest 
challenges in biology (Krause et al. 2007; Levins and Lewontin 1980; Sutherland 1996), and is 
perhaps one of the major challenges in the behavioral sciences generally (e.g., Coleman 1986). 
Although human behavioral ecologists recognize the existence of a feedback loop between 
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micro- and macro-scales of analysis (Irons 1979; Mace 2014; Nettle et al. 2013), behavioral 
decision models in HBE have not been thoroughly integrated with structural approaches (Gray 
2000; Winterhalder and Smith 2000). Our results indicate the promise of network analysis tools 
to assist with such integration. However, while our analyses help us illuminate how broader 
socioeconomic patterns are linked to household decisions, the cross-sectional nature of our data 
means that we are unable to fully disentangle the chains of causality. We believe that the causal 
arrow in this case likely goes both ways: wealth enables greater harvesting and greater sharing, 
but sharing in turn may help sustain wealth due to the links to political influence. In the future, 
longitudinal network analyses will have the potential to help anthropologists more clearly 
unravel the complex dynamics of sharing and inequality. 
Despite the limitations of our cross-sectional approach, this study provides suggestive 
results regarding the conjugate role of individual decisions and social structure in broader 
processes of social and cultural change. Food sharing among Inuit redistributes wealth, but the 
act of redistribution is in itself a way to create and to legitimate inequality because it reinforces 
patterns of social distinction in the settlement. A network approach, which treats interactions as 
the basis for social structure and allows the analysis of economic decisions to be situated within 
that social structure, thus offers particularly useful tools for challenging the “fruitless assumption 
that culture comes from culture” (Steward 1955: 36). Specifically, this research supports classic 
anthropological arguments about exchange as a “total social fact”  (Mauss 1923) that permeates 
cultural institutions and transcends economic, political, and social spheres (Malinowski 1920; 
Sahlins 1963; Weiner 1992; Wiessner 2002), while simultaneously being compatible with 
evolutionary ecological approaches that give primacy to microeconomic trade-offs as drivers of 
human behavior. 
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Endnotes 
1To create a variable representing kinship ties extending beyond parent/child and sibling relationships, a secondary 
kinship network was created by, first of all, creating supra-household level kinship clusters based on the parent-
sibling ties represented in the close kin network. These sibling groups were then linked to the sibling groups of their 
parents, and where possible, the parents of their parents. The resulting kinship groups should include, minimally, 
relationships to cousins, aunts/uncles, and grandparents/grandchildren. Some households with only more distant kin 
ties in the community were assigned to kinship groups based on their last names.  
2In exponential random graph modeling, simulated networks are created in a manner analogous to flipping a coin 
with different weights, based on the predictors in the model, for all the possible edges in the network. The 
distribution of simulated network properties are then compared to the empirical network to assess whether the 
predictors in the model are able to replicate the observed network structures. Unlike traditional statistical methods, 
ERGMs can account for non-independence of social relations. Harris (2014) and articles in Handcock et al. (2008) 
provide good overviews of the logic of ERG modeling and of model fitting procedures. 
3The magnitude, standard errors, significance and confidence intervals of regression coefficients were considered as 
well as model AIC (using the function stepAIC) to determine which variables to include in the final models 
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presented here. Regression diagnostics were examined for all models presented; adjustments to the models, such as 
removing outliers and transformation of the variables, are noted wherever they were required. 
4The ERGM presented here is the model with (a) the minimum number of control parameters needed to generate 
random networks with comparable structure (i.e., number of edges, degree distribution, and shared partnerships); 
and, (b) the lowest AIC obtained for a model with those control parameters and the set of predictor variables 
considered. 
5Variables considered in the model building process include: kinship, the physical distance between households, 
harvest production, ownership of hunting vehicles, household annual income, giving of food over the radio, 
household food security, age of the oldest household member, whether the household was headed by a single 
female, the size of the household, the workplaces of people in the household, if a household member had ever been 
elected to the municipal council, and whether a member of the household was currently a member of an elected 
village council. The effect of each of these terms on both giving and receiving for households was considered in the 
model fitting procedure, as well as the effect of shared group membership (homophily) where relevant. For example, 
homophily was examined among super-households to assess whether generalized reciprocity might operate within 
this sub-group of households. In addition, a variable representing the combination of a household’s harvest 
production level (Low, Middle, or Super) and food security status (Secure/Insecure) is used to represent different 
strategies of engagement in the cash and subsistence economies. Three terms (edges, in-degree(0) and GWESP) are 
included in the model as control parameters. The geometrically-weighted edgewise shared partnerships (GWESP) 
model term is included to control for transitivity in the network  (Hunter and Handcock 2006; Hunter 2008). The 
reciprocity terms models the likelihood of a tie in one direction, given that a tie already exists in the other direction. 
6To assess whether contingency might occur only within certain groups, terms for reciprocity for kin groups and 
harvest production groups were also examined. However, this analysis revealed that a global model term for 
reciprocity was a more parsimonious explanation of network structures. Although the model therefore suggests that 
contingency is important for all sharing ties, this conclusion is affected by the limitations of current implementations 
of ERG modeling. The mutual model term in the package ergm (Handcock et al. 2003) can calculate reciprocity 
within groups based on node-level covariates but terms for reciprocity based on network covariates cannot be 
included independently.  
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Table 1:  Summary of ERGM of country food sharing 
Model parameter  Term type  Coef. S.E. Odd-ratio p-value 
Edges (intercept) Control term -7.202 .328 .001 <.001 
In-degree(0) Control term -1.690 .725 .184 .020 
Close kinship Edge covariateb 3.052 .146 21.165 <.001 
Kin groups Edge covariate 1.269 .130 3.557 <.001 
Distance (m) Edge covariate -.001 .000 .999 <.001 
Harvest production (Mid) Node out-factorc .511 .164 1.666 .002 
Harvest production (Super)  Node out-factor .858 .208 2.359 <.001 
Hunting vehicles Node out-covariatec  .051 .028 1.052 .070 
Annual income (per $10000) Node out-covariate  .057 .021 1.059 .006 
FM giving Node out-factor .228 .114 1.256 .045 
Food security Node out-factor -.347 .154 .707 .025 
Workplace A Node out-factor .476 .151 1.610 .002 
Workplace B Node out-factor .340 .110 1.405 .002 
Hunting vehicles Node in-covariatec -.100 .029 .905 <.001 
Age oldest HH member Node in-covariate .037 .004 1.038 <.001 
Single female-headed Node in-factorc .536 .119 1.709 <.001 
I-Low to I-Mida Node attribute mixingd  .777 .442 2.174 .079 
I-Mid to I-Low Node attribute mixing  .969 .355 2.635 .006 
I-Mid to S-Low Node attribute mixing  -2.454 .030 .086 <.001 
I-Super to S-Low Node attribute mixing  .999 .370 2.716 .007 
S-Super to I-Super Node attribute mixing  .675 .360 1.965 .061 
S-Super to S-Low Node attribute mixing  .805 .248 2.237 .001 
S-Super to S-Mid Node attribute mixing  .663 .236 1.940 .005 
S-Super to S-Super  Node attribute mixing  .988 .252 2.686 <.001 
Reciprocity Dyadic dependencee 1.577 .217 4.841 <.001 
GWESP (alpha=0.1) Dyadic dependence  .571 .089 1.770 <.001 
Null deviance = 16622, df = 11990 
    Residual deviance = 2613, df = 11964 
    Log-likelihood = -1306.268 
    AIC = 2664.537         
a I = food insecure, S = food secure, Low/Mid/Super refers to household harvest production levels 
b Edge covariates are terms describing the nature of the relationship between two households, for example, 
the distance in meters between two households. 
c Node in-/out- terms reflect the impact of household-level attributes on tie formation. Out/in refer to terms 
that affect outgoing ties (giving) vs. incoming ties (receiving). Covariates are numeric predictors while 
factors are categorical. 
d Node attribute mixing terms model the probability of ties between households with specific combinations 
of attributes. 
e Dyadic dependence terms model the effect of ties on other ties.  Reciprocity refers to the increased 
probability of a mutual tie. GWESP, Geometrically-Weighted Edgewise Shared Partnerships, models the 
increased likelihood of two households having a tie if they have a partner in common.  
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Table 2: Logistic regression results for historic council membership and 2013 council 
memberships 
 
2013 councils 
 
Historical council 
Model parameter  Retained? Odds-ratio Coef. S.E. p-value   Retained? Odds-ratio Coef. S.E. p-value 
Intercept Yes <0.001 -7.708 1.915 <0.001 
 
Yes <0.001 -16.747 4.171 <0.001 
Sharing network out-degreea No – – – – 
 
Yes 4.970 1.604 0.684 0.019 
Super-HHb (0/1) No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
Harvesting HH (0/1) No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
Food secure (0/1) No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
HH income per $10 000a No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
# hunt vehiclesa Yes 11.355 2.430 0.983 0.013 
 
Yes 4.893 1.588 0.753 0.035 
Mean HH agea No – – – – 
 
Yes 20.346 3.013 1.003 0.003 
Single-female headed (0/1) No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
HH sizea No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
FM giving (0/1) Yes 24.336 3.192 0.978 0.001 
 
No – – – – 
Historic council member (0/1) Yes 8.209 2.105 0.922 0.022 
 
N/A – – – – 
# of other HH with close kin No – – – – 
 
No – – – – 
Kinship group size No – – – –   No – – – – 
 
Null deviance = 87.333, df = 108 
 
Null deviance = 103.907, df = 108 
 
Residual deviance = 43.129, df = 105 
 
Residual deviance = 62.113, df = 105 
  Model vs. null deviance: χ2 = 44.204, p < 0.001   Model vs. null deviance: χ2 = 41.369, p < 0.001 
a These variables that were log-transformed (log(x+1)) in the model. 
b HH = household. 
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Figure 1: Kangiqsujuaq country food sharing network. Households color-coded by food security 
status, nodes sized by harvest production level (Low/Mid/Super). One-way ties shown in grey, 
reciprocal ties in black.  
Figure 2: Examples of ERGM tie probabilities between different household types. Distance 
between households, household income, age of the eldest household member, FM giving, and 
workplace are held constant in these examples, which show only the effects of close vs. distant 
kinship, food security, harvest production and hunting vehicle ownership, and single female 
household heads. Households were assigned the median number of hunting vehicles for their 
demographic (5 for food-secure super-households, 2 for food-insecure super-households, and 1 
for the other groups shown). Bold numbers indicate the effects of reciprocity on the probability 
of a tie: if a → b is completed, then b → a has an enhanced probability.  
Figure 3: Characteristics of Kangiqsujuaq 2013-2014 council members and non-members   
Figure 4: Kinship network positions of past and present local council members. Black nodes are 
council members. Nodes in (a) sized by total length of tenure of household members on the 
council, in (b) by number of 2013 council positions held by household members.   
Figure 5: Lorenz curves showing the distribution of several forms of wealth in Kangiqsujuaq. G 
= Gini coefficient. Although almost all households participate in some harvesting, the harvest 
curves refer to the household’s take of four important food species (ringed seal, geese, beluga, 
and caribou). 
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